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 Joseph Schumpeter’s vision of competition saw it as a 
destructive process in which effort, assets and fortunes were 
continuously destroyed by innovation.  This endless process 
displaced older technologies in order to make way for new ones, but 
led to economic growth far greater than more stable, conservative 
alternatives.1  Schumpeter’s vision was striking, in sharp contrast 
with the conventional neoclassical model of competitive markets, 
where the focus was on changes in output and price, relatively 
leisurely shifts in consumer tastes, and exceptional strategic 
behavior that occasionally dislodged one technology and displaced it 
by another.  Neoclassical competition is a little like watching the 
ocean when it is calm, while Schumpeterian competition is like 
watching a raging storm or perhaps even a tidal wave. 
 
As Evans and Hylton so powerfully observe, neoclassical 
economics is much more comfortable modeling the relatively stable 
situation than the Schumpeterian one. 2  Economists since Alfred 
Marshall have observed that the static, partial equilibrium analysis 
that dominates industrial economics is readily susceptible to 
mathematics, and many of its rather specific propositions are 
testable3  The Schumpeter model may be testable at a very general 
level, but probably not in any sense that antitrust policy finds useful.  
Schumpeter’s analysis is much too concerned with the mostly 
unmanageable realities of the economy as a whole and with largely 
unanticipated developments that cannot readily by modeled within 
                                                 
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
 
1Most famously in Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1942), particularly chapter 7, on “The Process of Creative 
Destruction.”  Some of his argument was anticipated in Joseph A. Schumpeter, 
The Theory of Economic Development (1912). 
 
2 David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, “The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of 
Monopoly Power and its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust.”  Competition 
Policy, Autumn 2008. 
 
3 On this point, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 835-
838 (1954; revised ed, 1984).  See also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neoclassical 
Crisis in U.S. Competition Policy, 1890-1955 (SSRN working paper, July, 2008, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156927). 
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2 Schumpeterian Competition 
the equilibrium-searching forces of neoclassical economics. 
 
To be sure, at a fairly general level the contributions that 
innovation makes to economic growth can be modeled, and to an 
extent the models can be empirically tested.  For example, the 
neoclassical growth model developed by Robert W. Solow in the 
1950s assumed that innovation is an exogenous factor in the 
economy, and one can test for its presence and magnitude by 
assessing the impact of endogenous factors and then assuming that 
the “residual,” or the amount by which growth exceeds these 
expectations, must be the result of innovation.4  For example, it 
leads to the testable hypothesis that relatively undeveloped 
economies will grow more quickly than developed ones because t
former can borrow innovations from the more developed, while the 
latter must develop them internally.  By contrast, endogenous grow
models tend to see innovation as growing out of variables that are 




                                                
 
Today Schumpeter’s conclusion that innovation results much 
more from convulsive, unexpected changes than from the gradual 
movement of a market toward competitive equilibrium is fairly well 
established.  What we cannot do, however, is ex ante measurement 
of the long run effects of specific innovation efforts.  Nor can we 
predict the long run impact of some observed practice on innovation, 
certainly not in marginal cases.  While innovation overall creates an 
enormous payoff to society, predicting successful innovations on a 
case-by-case basis is a fool’s errand.  Testing like that done of 
Solow’s neoclassical growth model is entirely ex post, looking back 
at the impact of previous innovation in a defined place and time 
period.  Further, it measures aggregate productivity only. 
 
A very high percentage of innovation programs fail, but the 
ones that succeed frequently provide enormous payoffs.  And of 
course the problem is that ex ante separation is impossible.  If we 
could predict successful innovations accurately then we could avoid 
 
4Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 
Q.J.Econ. 65 (1956); Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate 
production Function, 3 Rev. Econ. Statistics 312 (1957). 
 
5 See Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 3 
(1994). 
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launching the unsuccessful ventures and save enormous resources.  
These problems have proven to be significant obstacles for 
economic analysis of specific antitrust claims where the question is 
likely effects on innovation in the future. 
 
Another problem with measuring innovation or its impact from 
an ex ante perspective is that innovation is so badly behaved in 
comparison with the ordinary price and output functions of 
neoclassical economics.  Most changes in price and output are 
continuous and related to one another.  We know enough about 
many types of practices (price fixing, predatory pricing, mergers, etc) 
to predict price and output effects.  But the consequences of 
innovation are often radically indeterminate – sometimes rewarding a 
large investment by producing nothing at all, or sometimes by 
producing results that were far different than anyone anticipated.6 
The classic example is Viagra, which was the result of a project 
seeking treatments for angina.  Protracted male erections were 
initially regarded by the researchers as an undesirable side effect of 
what would later become one of the most successful 
pharmaceuticals ever.7 
 
As Evans and Hylton observe, in antitrust economic analysis 
we tend to look at the price and output effects of practices.  We 
evaluate them by asking whether they tend toward increased or 
decreased output, higher or lower prices, or whether they injure 
consumers over a testable time period, which is typically quite short.  
We do not try to show more, because for the most part we cannot 
answer second order questions about long run welfare implications.  
In the short run a practice may destroy a rival, produce monopoly, 
and may even appear to impair consumer welfare.  But in the longer 
run it may be part of the very process of creative destruction that 
Schumpeter believed to be the bedrock of economic progress.  Or to 
say it differently, it may be quite easy for an antitrust economist to 
predict that a particular exclusionary practice will tend to produce 
lower marketwide output and higher prices.  But it is very likely 
impossible to predict whether some inchoate innovation that is part 
                                                 
6 Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 Cardozo L.Rev. 247 (2007). 
7 See id. at 256-257; and  Ian H. Osterloh, The Discovery and Development of 
Viagra (sildenafil citrate) in Sildenafil 1, 3 (U. Duzendorfer, ed. Burkhäuser Verlag 
2004). 
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of the monopolist’s scheme might produce long term gains that 
greatly outweigh these short term losses. 
 
 That argument is difficult to dispute, but it is subject to several 
limitations that serve to dilute its importance. Indeed, the observation 
may do little more than act as a warning that antitrust economics, 
and more importantly federal judges, must keep one wandering eye 
on the long run.  Here are the qualifiers I would add: 
 
1. We should not confuse the prospect of innovation with the 
scope of the intellectual property laws; 
 
2. For many practices positive innovation effects are difficult to 
foresee even on Schumpeter’s own expansive and 
nonmathematical terms; 
 
3.  Many antitrust violations restrain rather than promote 
innovation. 
On these points. 
 
First, one must never confuse the prospect of innovation with the 
scope of the intellectual property laws.  While Evans and Hylton are 
speaking generally about competition and innovation as 
complementary rather than competing products, they refer to this 
principle by suggesting that there is “no fundamental tension 
between the policies of antitrust law and intellectual property law; 
both balance the benefits and costs of static and dynamic 
competition for the economy as a whole.”8  While that might be true 
of an economy with ideal competition law and intellectual property 
law systems, it is hardly true of the world that we actually live in.  In 
fact, both the Patent Act and the Copyright Act have produced 
bloated regulatory regimes that probably serve to undermine 
innovation as often as they promote it, and almost certainly do more 
damage to the innovation process than the antitrust laws themselves 
do.  Indeed, there is reason to believe that the patent system fails to 
carry its freight in any market except perhaps chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals;9 and the copyright system has become a 
                                                 
8Evans and Hylton,  “Lawful Acquisition,” note 2 at 3. 
 
9 James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, 
Bureaucrats, and Lawyers put Innovators at Risk (2008); and Robert P. Merges, 
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playground for special interest groups.10 
 
Of course, federal judges are not at liberty to rewrite the detailed 
patent and copyright codes simply because they believe them to be 
badly designed.  But the fact is that one cannot infer that if a conflict 
appears between competition policy and IP, siding with the latter is 
more conducive to further innovation.  Further, as noted below, the 
antitrust laws may do a better job of furthering innovation than IP 
does, provided that it is sufficiently sensitive to the problem of 
innovation restraints. 
 
The fact is that in the legal situation we face currently we can 
probably do far more to promote innovation by reformulating IP 
policy than by reformulating antitrust policy.  For example, a more 
serious proof of harm requirement could go a long way, perhaps 
more in copyright than in patent.  If an infringement benefits the 
infringer and its customers and causes no harm to the IP holder then 
it is a Pareto improvement.  Injury should be measured in terms of 
the ex ante incentive to create the protected work in the first place.11 
 
My second point is that for many practices challenged by the 
antitrust laws innovation effects are difficult to assess or even 
foresee on Schumpeter’s own nonmathematical terms.  Not every 
antitrust violation has significant implications for innovation.  Pricing 
practices are a good example.  When properly defined, both price 
fixing and predatory pricing involve changing the price of a good in 
anticompetitive ways.  Neither one has obvious implications for 
innovation subject to one exception: one can always argue that a 
firm will use monopoly profits to innovate more, and that the gains 
from the resulting innovation might possibly far exceed the losses 
from short-run consumer injuries.  But this argument proves too 
much and justifies monopoly no matter how created or maintained. 
 
                                                                                                                            
One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 Cal. L. 
Rev. 2187, 2336 (2000).  Even relative conservatives such as Landes and Posner 
find overprotection.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Intellectual Property Law, Ch. 1 (2003). 
 
10Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 567, 
568 (2006). 
11 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability and Fair Use, 85 
Washington Univ. L.Rev. 969 (2007). 
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On the other hand, if a practice challenged under the antitrust 
laws actually furthers innovation, one would expect that the 
defendant could provide an explanation and some evidence of this. 
For example, if exclusive dealing really is being used to protect the 
market for an incipient product then the defendant should be able to 
tell us and this information should be incorporated into our rule of 
reason analysis. 
 
 Finally, the third point is that many antitrust violations restrain 
rather than promote innovation.  Indeed there are good reasons for 
believing that market dominating firms or joint ventures with a 
significant investment in their technology are more likely to use 
exclusionary practices to restrain the innovations of rivals or potential 
rivals than to develop or promote their own innovations.  For the 
most part, the technology and markets of dominant firms are well 
established and they tend to profit from stable growth.  By contrast, 
the small firm seeking entry must shake up the pot. 
 
 Evans and Hylton give the very interesting example borrowed 
from the Dentsply case12 of a firm that develops a new and 
innovative but unpatentable tooth.  It must then use exclusive dealing 
in order to capitalize on its investment by excluding rivals via a 
restraint on market access rather than the IP laws.13  Whether that 
story is plausible or not, there is an alternative story that is at least as 
plausible.  Suppose that a smaller rival has developed an innovative 
artificial tooth that may very well be patentable, but success depends 
on market access.  Further, this artificial tooth threatens to take a 
significant share of the market once it is successfully deployed.  
Dentsply’s exclusive dealing serves to deny it market access. 
 
 In this case the antitrust violation has served to restrain rather 
than promote innovation.  The story is more plausible than the 
Evans/Hylton story for two reasons.  First, in this setting market 
shifting innovations are more likely to come from smaller firms.  Once 
it has attained dominance a firm’s interest in creative destruction 
                                                 
 
12 United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1089 (2006) (condemning exclusive dealing as unlawful 
monopolization under §2 of the Sherman Act).  See 3B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶768 (3d Ed. 2008). 
 
13Evans and Hylton, “Lawful Acquisition,” note 2 at 40. [TAN 108]. 
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becomes greatly diminished because it is as likely to be the victim as 
the enabler.  Indeed, often a firm’s investment in its own technology 
creates a form of path dependence.  Its vested interests lie much 
more in preserving what it has rather than producing a huge market 
shifting innovation. Or it tends to innovate in ways that take 
advantage of technology and property rights in which it has already 
made an investment.  By contrast, the smaller rival succeeds by 
differentiating its product from that of the dominant firm.14  Second, 
exclusive dealing by a dominant firm is very likely a more effective 
means of excluding a smaller rival’s innovation than it is of promoting 
the dominant firm’s own innovation.  Indeed, Evans and Hylton have 
to assume that the IP laws provide no protection in order to make 
their story work. 
 
Finally, modeling the incentives to restrain innovation is at 
least potentially more tractable than modeling innovation itself, 
although measuring long run effects is often just as difficult.  
Restraints on innovation typically show up in creation or perpetuation 
of monopoly prices, reduced output, and the like.  That is, a 
dominant firm typically restrains innovation in order to prevent its 
market position from eroding.  Such gains to the monopolist are 
subject to the ordinary measurement tools of forensic economics. 
 
The boycott situation is similar to the vertical exclusion story.  
Consider the Allied Tube case, which involved a boycott by the 
manufacturers of steel electrical conduit intended to exclude a 
market shifting innovation – conduit made from PVC.15  PVC conduit 
was cheaper, easier to work with and did not short out when it came 
into contact with an electrical wire.  Allied, whose manufacturing 
commitment was entirely to steel, plainly foresaw what later became 
a market reality: plastic conduit would swamp the field.  It therefore 
organized a boycott designed to exclude plastic conduit from the 
market by writing its use out of municipal building codes. 
 The Allied Tube story is a particularly easy and obvious one, 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz and S. E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in and 
History," 11 J. L., Econ., and Org. 205  (1995); J. Farrell and G. Saloner, Installed 
Base and Compatability: Innovation, Product preannouncements, and Predation, 
76 Am.Econ.Rev. 940 (1986). 
 
15 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496-497 
(1988). 
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because PVC conduit was an innovation in its final stages of market 
preparation.  Its market success was reasonably foreseeable by the 
time the antitrust violation occurred.16  More incipient innovations are 
easier for dominant firms to exclude.  Further, the violations are more 
difficult to detect, and it is certainly more difficult to prove injury.  
Consider the pressure that Microsoft placed on Intel to stop its Java-
enabled chip R&D program lest Microsoft yank support for future 
editions of Windows.17  Java is a multi-platform processing 
language.  At the time the Java-enabled chip threatened to make 
alternative operating systems “compatible” with Microsoft Windows 
by enabling software developers to write software that would operate 
on multiple platforms and communicate seamlessly with one an
By excluding Java Microsoft stood to gain the higher market share 
and prices that resulted from suppressing innovative competition t
threatened to make Windows one of many alternative platforms.  
Consumers lost uncertain value, depending on the likelihood that the 
chip would have succeeded and its market impact.  Or consider the 
many, many cases involving Walker Process style patent 
infringement lawsuits based on improperly obtained patents or on 
irrationally broad patent claims.
other.  
hat 
                                                
18  Many of these are lawsuits 
brought by large firms with a heavy investment in their existing 
technology, designed to oust the innovative technology of a less well 
financed rival. 
 
In sum, one place the antitrust laws could be more aggressive 
than they are today is when the stars are in alignment.  An important 
corollary of the premise that innovation contributes much more to 
 
16 For a similar story, see Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 
U.S. 556 (1982), which involved an agreement among the members of an 
accreditation association to suppress a superior valve technology, with the result 
that the plaintiff’s valve could not be marketed.  See 13 Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law ¶2115  (2d ed. 2005).  
 
17See Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, note 6, 29 Cardozo L.Rev. at 
249-250 (discussing  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 29 
(D.D.C. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, but affirmed on this issue, United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001)). 
 
18 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965).  See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶706 (3d ed. 
2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Walker Process Doctrine: Infringement Lawsuits 
as Antitrust Violations (SSRN working paper, Sep. 2008, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1259877). 
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economic growth than does price competition and short run 
efficiency, is that a restraint on innovation can do much more harm.  
Restraints such as the ones at issue in Allied Tube and Microsoft 
simultaneously produce higher prices in the dominant firm’s market 
and loss of innovation in incipient markets that are delayed or not 
permitted to materialize. 
 
The obvious question that raises is When is an antitrust 
violation more likely to be innovation enhancing rather than 
innovation restraining?  While that question may be very difficult to 
answer in some cases, in others it appears not to be.  For example, 
where a dominant firm is using an exclusionary practice to protect its 
established investment from an incipient technology harm to 
innovation seems the most likely outcome. 
 
The most difficult set of cases is likely to involve joint ventures 
and at least some mergers, where the dangers of collusion must be 
set against the very real possibilities that the union will promote 
significant innovation.  Standard setting is another area.  The 
potential cost savings from reliable standards can be enormous, but 
the process can be used to exclude novel technologies.  For 
example, the Hydrolevel case involved a situation where a standard 
setting committee within the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers was manipulated into denying approval, and thus market 
access, to the plaintiff’s innovative valve when the dominant firm 
perceived a market threat.19 
 
It is also worth noting that restraints on innovation can be 
addressed under both antitrust policy and a properly formulated IP 
policy.  For example, the doctrine of patent or copyright “misuse” can 
be a device for combating contractual devices or overly broad claims 
by IP holders that tend to restrain rival innovations. But misuse 
claims apply only against IP holders, and typically only in defenses 
against infringement lawsuits.20  The restraints at issue in cases like 
                                                 
19 Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).  See 
also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496-497 
(1988). 
  
20 See 10 Phillip E. Areeda, Einer Elhauge, and Herbert Hovenkamp ¶1781 (2d 
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Allied Tube and Microsoft did not involve firms acting as IP holders 
but rather as market participants with considerable leverage over 
others and existing technologies that they wished to protect. 
 
An increased antitrust concern with restraints on innovation 
places a premium on government enforcement for the very reason 
that Evans and Hylton suggest: economic proof of the effects of 
restraints on innovation is so difficult to obtain, thus making proof of 
private injury and damages very difficult.  A case in point is the 
tagalong litigation in Kloth v. Microsoft, where the Fourth Circuit 
ulimtately held that private plaintiffs could not obtain damages for 
Microsoft’s suppression of Intel’s Java chip program because they 
were too speculative.  As the court observed, “It would be entirely 
speculative and beyond the competence of a judicial proceeding to 
create in hindsight a technological universe that never came into 
existence. . . .21  While private plaintiffs must show causation and 
actual injury for damages or threatened injury for an injunction, the 
United States or Federal Trade Commission acting as enforcer need 




 Schumpeter was correct that over the long run the gains from 
innovation dwarf the gains from government intervention to make the 
economy more competitive under the traditional criteria of price and 
output.  It follows that the losses resulting from restraints on 
innovation could be very large as well.  The problem of ex ante 
measurement of the social losses that result from a restraint on an 
undeveloped innovation are equivalent to the problem of ex ante 
measurement of the gains that the innovation would have produced 
had the innovation process been permitted to run its course.  In both 
cases an ex ante assessment could be virtually impossible and in 
any case would be highly speculative. 
 
 But that does not necessarily mean that antitrust cannot do 
anything about the problem.  In some cases, all that is necessary is 
to consider short run consequences for competition and ignore 
                                                 
21 Kloth v. Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312, 323 (4th Cir. 2006); see Hovenkamp, 
Restraints on Innovation, note 6, 29 Cardozo L.Rev. at 259. 
 
22 See 2 & 2A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶303, 
326 (3d ed. 2007). 
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innovation possibilities that are too remote to see.  In other cases 
one should consider whether an innovation or a restraint on 
innovation is the more likely outcome.  The likelihood that a practice  
furthers innovation should serve to weaken or perhaps even 
undermine the antitrust concern.  By contrast,  the likelihood that a 
practice restrains innovation should deserve a much closer look. 
 
